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This Petition for Writ of Certiorari hereby incorporates the
amicus

curiae

briefs

submitted

by

the

Utah

Self-Insurers'

Association and The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah,

This

Petition refers to the amicus briefs where necessary, but will not
repeat the arguments made in the briefs of the Utah Self-Insurers
Association and The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah,
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of

Certiorari

pursuant

to

Rule

46(c),

Utah

Rules

of Appellate

Procedure, on the grounds that Crosland v. Board of Review of
Industrial Commission, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992) ,
radically departed from: (a) the explicit language in the statute
and (2) the accepted and usual finding of fact by the Medical Panel
that

applicant's

permanent

impairment

from

developmental

abnormalities to the spine contributed to his industrial injury and
constituted "any permanent impairment that existed prior to an
industrial accident...11 within the meaning of § 35-1-66, Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended).
2.

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of

Certiorari pursuant to Rule 46(b) on the grounds that Crosland v.
Industrial

Commission

contravenes

the

standard

of

review

established in Morton v. Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)
and

the

analysis

of

asymptomatic

conditions

in Hollowav v.

Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31 (Utah 1986).
3.

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of

Certiorari under Rule 46(a) on the grounds that the there is a
direct conflict between the decisions Crosland v. Industrial
5021594.jae
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Commission, 18 3 Utah Adv. Rep. at 3 5, and Nyrehn v. Industrial
Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990).
4.

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of

Certiorari under Rule 46(d) on the grounds that Crosland v.
Industrial Commission profoundly disrupts the de€>p-seated public
policy objective of encouraging Utah employers to hire workers with
disabilities and impairments by establishing a fair basis for
apportioning workers' compensation disability awards.
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioners seek review by Petition for Writ of Certiorari of
the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

decision

Commission, 18 3 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35.

Crosland

v.

Industrial

(See Appendix "A.")

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was filed on March
20,

1992.

Jurisdiction to consider the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari sought by petitioners is conferred upon the Utah Supreme
Court by Article VIII, § 3, Utah Constitution; §§ 78-2-2(3) and
(5), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended); and, Rule 45, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
The following provisions of Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended) are controlling and attached in Appendix "B":
§ 35-1-44(4)

§ 35-1-66

§ 35-1-44(6)

§ 35-1-69

The controlling rule is Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

5021594.jae
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of "permanent

impairment" from the American Medical Association Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment is attached in Appendix "C."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This claim was filed by applicant for an industrial accident
while employed at Young Electric Sign Company.

Applicant injured

his low back and all physicians agreed that claimant had a
preexisting, asymptomatic condition that was aggravated by the
industrial injury.

Applicant filed a claim before the Industrial

Commission of Utah against his employer.
On February 28, 1990, an evidentiary hearing on applicant's
claim was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") of the
Industrial Commission of Utah. (R.36.)

On March 30, 1990, the

Industrial Commission mailed its Summary of Medical Record and
Testimony to the parties. (R.56-61.)
any party to the Summary.

No objections were filed by

On April 27, 1990, the ALJ appointed

Drs. Madison Thomas and Wallace Hess as medical panel members to
make an impartial evaluation of applicant's claim.

(R.56-57.) On

June 21, 1990, the Industrial Commission mailed copies of the
Report of Medical Panel dated May 8, 1990 to all parties. (R.65.)
On August 24, 1990, the ALJ issued the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order which adopted the Report of Medical
Panel and ordered defendants to pay temporary total and permanent
partial compensation

in excess of $12,000, interest, and all

medical expenses. (R. 77-77.)
On September 11, 1990, applicant filed a Motion for Review and
objected to the failure of the ALJ to award an additional ten
percent permanent partial compensation for the aggravation of
5021594.jae
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claimant's preexisting, asymptomatic developmental abnormalities.
(R. 79-82.)

Defendants responded to the Motion. (R. 86-90).

On

April 25, 1991, the Commission issued its Order Denying Motion for
Review and affirmed the ALJ's Order.

(R. 114-117).

On May 24, 1991, applicant filed a Petition For Review with
the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. 120.)

On March 20, 1992, the Utah

Court of Appeals filed its opinion. (See Appendix "A.")
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Report of Medical Panel found that applicant was stable
and had a twenty percent whole person permanent impairment rating
with one-half, ten percent, specifically attributed to preexisting,
developmental

abnormalities in the spine.

(R. 183-184.)

The

Medical Panel explained it was "unlikely that he [applicant] would
have had the degree of difficulty had he not had the developmental
abnormality."

(R. 182.)

The Panel explicitly found that the

developmental abnormality and the industrial accident were "both
. . . contributory . . . ." (R. 182-183.)
The Medical

Panel

described

the

claimants

injuries as

follows:
%

Whole
Man
Low back:
Spondylolisthesis
unoperated with limited
range of motion

20%

09 Feb
1989
1/2

Preexisting
Condition(s)
1/2

. . . .

The industrial injury did medically aggravate a preexisting condition of the applicant.
Comment:
As
indicated previously, this was an asymptomatic condition,
but an abnormal status with a present to a sufficient
degree to be contributory to his present impaired status.
(R. 184-85.)

5021594.jae
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On February 9, 1989, the claimant and another employee were
moving a sign that weighed approximately 200 pounds and he twisted
his upper torso to move around a corner and injured his low back.
(R. 73.) Applicant finished his work shift that day, but the next
day he was directed by his employer to obtain medical treatment.
(R.

73.)

The

claimant's

CT

scan

showed

that

there

was

spondylolysis at L-5 and preexisting lumbar disc disease at L3-4
and L5-S1 that were clearly not caused by the injury on the
preceding day. (R. 74.)
claimant

a twenty

Applicant's treating physician gave the

percent whole person

September 28, 1989. (R. 74.)

impairment

rating on

In January 1990, the applicant was

rated as having a work capacity to perform medium/light work. (R.
74.)
In the Findings of Fact, applicant was reported to never had
any prior back problems and the ALT concluded as follows:
The panel found that the applicant was
medically stable as of the date of examination
(May 8, 1990) and that the applicant had a 20%
whole person impairment related to the
industrial injury, with 1/2 or 10% of that
rating
attributable
to
the
applicant's
asymptomatic pre-existing spondylolisthesis
and 10% attributable to the industrial injury.
(R. 74-75.)
In the Motion for Review, claimant objected to the award of
permanent partial disability compensation on the grounds that he
was entitled to an additional ten percent in permanent partial
compensation

for

the

preexisting,

asymptomatic

developmental

abnormalities. (R. 79-82.) In the Order Denying Motion for Review,
the Industrial Commission found no evidence that applicant's low
5021594.jae
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back was symptomatic. (R. 114-115.) However, the Commission ruled
that the claimant's preexisting spondylolisthesis (breaking down or
dissolution of the body of the vertebrae) and spondylolisthesis
(forward movement of the body of one vertebrae on the lower
vertebrae below it) caused one-half of applicant's twenty percent
whole person impairment rating.

(R. 114-115.) The Commission held

that the findings of the ALJ had ample support in the evidence.
The Commission noted that in the opinion of the ALJ and the Medical
Panel

the

job

injury

and

preexisting

conditions

were

"contributory." (R. 115.) The Commission found that the allocation
between the preexisting condition and the industrial injury of ten
percent was reasonable.

(R. 115.)

The Commission held that an

identical allocation had been approved in Nyrehn v. Industrial
Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah 1990). (R. 115.)
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the rulings by the ALJ and
Commission and awarded applicant compensation for the ten percent
impairment that preexisted the industrial accident.
ARGUMENT I
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED UNDER RULE 46(c),
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, FOR THE REASON THAT
THE INTERPRETATION OF § 35-1-66 BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CONTRAVENES THE EXPLICIT LANGUAGE IN THE STATUTE AND THE
GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT
Rule 46(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that
a Writ of Certiorari will be granted when a decision by the Utah
Court of Appeals "has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial

proceedings

or has

so sanctioned

such a

departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of supervision."
5021594.jae

The Crosland v. Board of
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Review, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, opinion is a sweeping change in
the accepted and usual course of claims before the Commission.
The Utah Court of Appeals incorrectly interpreted the terms
"any

physical

impairment"

in

§ 35-1-66

to mean

"functional

^permanent impairment'" in reliance on the language in the statute,
legislative history, and decisions in other states. Id. at 37. The
court failed to cite or rely on the usual, accepted, and precise
definition of "impairment" in the Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment 2-3 (A. Engelberg 3rd ed. 1988).
1-66

does not expressly

or

impliedly

restrict

Section 35-

impairment to

functional impairment. The legislative history cited by the court
only describes compensation "based on physical impairment caused by
an industrial accident[,]" without any mention or reference to
functional impairment.

Id. at 37 (quoting Laws of Utah ch. 116

H.B. no. 218 preamble.)

The court was persuaded by authority from

states where the terms "impairment" and "disability" were confused.
Id. (citations omitted).

By contrast, the term "impairment" in §

35-1-66 is not limited or clarified by language that connotes
disability or functional diminishment.
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the ALJ and Commission and
found that applicant was entitled to twenty percent permanent
partial compensation under § 35-1-66. The court, however, did not
disagree with any of the findings of the Medical Panel. Thus, the
court affirmed that ten percent of applicant's permanent impairment
existed prior to the industrial accident, that ten percent of the
impairment was caused by the accident, and that the asymptomatic

5021594.jae

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

developmental abnormalities were contributory to the industrial
injury.
The first sentence and the second to the last paragraph of §
35-1-66 are dispositive of this appeal.
35-1-66 provides that

The first sentence of §

ff

[a]n employee who sustained a permanent

impairment as a result of an industrial accident and who files an
application

for hearing

under Section

35-1-98 may

receive a

permanent partial disability award from the commission."
requirement

that

a

claimant

may

receive

permanent

The

partial

disability benefits only for permanent impairment caused by an
industrial accident is made explicit in the second to the last
paragraph of § 35-1-66 which provides that "[p]ermanent partial
disability

compensation

may

not

be

paid

for

any

permanent

impairment that existed prior to an industrial accident."
The language of § 35-1-66 cannot be clearer that permanent
partial disability

compensation

cannot be paid

impairment that preexists the industrial injury.

for permanent
The terms "any

permanent impairment" were not defined in the Workers' Compensation
Act until recent amendments defined "impairment" and "disability"
in §§ 35-1-44(4) and (6), Utah Code Annotated (1991).

Impairment

is defined as "a purely medical condition reflecting any anatomical
or functional abnormality or loss."

§ 35-1-44(6).

"'Disability'

means becoming medically impaired as to function."

§ 35-1-44(4).

These amendments were not in effect at the time of applicant's
injury, but the definitions in §§ 35-1-44 merely codified the wellsettled meanings of the terms "impairment" and "disability."

5021594.jae
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As with many terms used in the Workers' Compensation Act, the
terms "any permanent impairment" are exclusively medical matters
for physicians. The parties, counsel, the ALJ, and the Industrial
Commission, cannot offer opinions on the existence or amount of
permanent "impairment" an injured worker may have. In the present
case, the applicant's permanent impairment was determined by the
treating and examining physicians, including the Medical Panel,
based solely on the standards in the American Medical Association
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (A. Engelberg 3rd
ed. 1988).

This treatise is devoted entirely to the evaluation of

"permanent impairment" and is the authoritative publication that
physicians rely on to perform impairment ratings.
The Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment defines
"impairment" and "disability" as follows:
The accurate and proper use of medical information to
assess impairment in connection with disability determinations
depends on the recognition that, whereas impairment is a
medical matter, disability arises out of the interaction
between impairment and external demands. Consequently, as
used in the Guidesf "impairment" means an alteration of an
individual's health status that is assessed by medical means,
"disability," which is assessed by nonmedical means, means an
alteration of an individual's capacity to meet personal,
social, or occupational demands, or to meet statutory or
regulatory requirements. Simply stated, "impairment" is what
is wrong with the health of an individual; "disability" is the
gap between what the individual cr.n do and what the individual
needs or wants to do.
Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
The Guides and §§ 35-1-44(4) and

(6) have substantially

similar definitions of "impairment" and "disability." The Medical
Panel assessed applicant's impairment by medical means strictly in
accordance with these medical definitions. The ALJ and Commission

5021594.jae
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were obligated to follow these medical assessments and adopted them
when the Report of Medical Panel was incorporated into the rulings.
The

opinions

by

the

physicians

on

the

extent

impairment are necessarily medical matters.

of

permanent

The independent,

impartial Medical Panel appointed by the Industrial Commission of
Utah concluded that there was a ten percent permanent partial
impairment that existed prior to the industrial accident and a ten
percent permanent partial

impairment that was caused

by the

accident. Applicant did not object to the Report of Medical Panel
or offer evidence in opposition to the Report of Medical Panel on
the ten percent preexisting permanent partial impairment. Thus, it
is undisputed that applicant received ten percent impairment as a
result of the industrial accident and a ten percent permanent
impairment that was not a result of the industrial accident within
the meaning of the first sentence of § 35-1-66.
The only dispute is whether the applicant is entitled to be
paid for the ten percent permanent impairment that existed prior to
the

industrial

accident pursuant to the

second

to the last

paragraph of § 35-1-66 as the statute was amended in 1988.

The

parties do not disagree with the findings of the Medical Panel that
the claimant's preexisting developmental abnormalities in his spine
were asymptomatic until aggravated by the industrial accident. The
absence of symptoms, however, does not mean that claimant did not
have a permanent impairment prior to the industrial accident, it
merely means that an expert opinion on the existence of permanent
impairment was based on medical evidence other than symptoms.

5021594.jae
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ARGUMENT II
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED UNDER RULE 46(b),
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT
THERE IS A CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
In the present case, petitioners are entitled to a Writ of
Certiorari in accordance with Rule 46(b), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, on the grounds that the Crosland decision conflicts with
the opinions Morton v. Tax Commission, 814 P. 2d at 581 (Utah 1991),
and Hollowav v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31 (Utah 1986).
Petitioners hereby incorporate the arguments in the briefs of the
Utah Self-Insurers' Association and The Workers7 Compensation Fund.
In Morton v. Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1991),
this Court noted that administrative cases filed after 1988 would
be

subject

to

review

by

appellate

courts

under

the

Utah

Administrative Procedure Act. Pursuant to the UAPA, interpretation
of statutory terms would be given deference if there was "an
explicit or implicit grant of discretion . . .
statute."

in the governing

Id. at 588. Where there is no discernable legislative

intent, the choice among interpretations is a policy decision and
"[t]he agency that has been granted authority to administer that
statute is the body to make such a determination."

Id. at 589.

Hence, without discernable legislative intent, an appellate court
should not substitute its interpretation of an issue for the
agency's, since "it is appropriate to conclude that the legislature
has delegated authority to the agency to decide the issue." Id.
The Crosland opinion cites the proper standard of review, but
fails to apply the standard.

The court declared that pursuant to

Morton it was required to interpret an amendment "to the Workers7
5021594. jae
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Compensation

Act

and

construction

and

legislative

correctness."

thus presents

a

question

of

intent which we may

18 3 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.

statutory
review for

However, the court was

obligated to defer to the Commission's interpretation of "permanent
impairment" under Morton, since the court failed to describe any
discernable express or implied legislative intent.

Moreover,

pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act the Commission has
discretion to apply its expertise as discussed in the brief of the
Utah Self-Insurers7 Association.
In Hollowav v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31, 32 (Utah
1986), Justices Zimmerman and Howe joined in a concurring opinion
and specifically rejected the theory that preexisting conditions
had

to

evidence

manifest

symptoms

as

a

prerequisite

to

apportionment. Latent, preexisting conditions had important public
policy considerations for impaired and disabled employees:
[T]he question is whether the worker came to the workplace
with a condition that increased his risk of injury. If he did
and that condition contributed to the injury, then Allen's
higher standard of legal causation comes into play so as to
place that worker on the same footing as one who did not come
to work with a preexisting condition.
. . .

To rule otherwise would create the strong likelihood that a
worker who has a preexisting condition and whose virtually
inevitable injury simply happens to occur at work will be able
to foist the cost of that injury on his employer when the
workplace had little to do with causing the injury.
Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals accepted the applicant's fallacious
argument that the absence of symptoms prior to the industrial
accident was tantamount to an absence of permanent impairment. This
argument contradicts the undisputed medical evidence in the Report

5021594.jae
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of Medical Panel and the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment that claimant had a ten percent permanent impairment
that existed prior to the industrial accident.

The Court of

Appeals erroneously failed to defer to the Commission's finding
that the undisputed medical evidence was that claimant had a ten
percent

permanent

impairment

that

preexisted

the

industrial

accident under an abuse of discretion standard of review in its
interpretation

of

the

Consequently, Crosland

terms

"any

permanent

rejects the public policy

impairment."
concerns in

Holloway v. Industrial Commission that asymptomatic, preexisting
conditions are the sole responsibility of the employer and cannot
be apportioned in a permanent partial disability award.
ARGUMENT III
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED PURSUANT TO RULE 4 6(a),
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, SINCE THERE IS A CONFLICT
BETWEEN PANELS OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioners are entitled to a Writ of Certiorari on the
grounds that the opinions of panels of the Utah Court of Appeals in
Crosland v. Board of Review and Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission,
800 P.2d

330 (Utah App. 1990), directly conflict, within the

meaning of Rule 46(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In

Croslandr the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the Commission shall
not apportion permanent partial disability compensation between
asymptomatic, preexisting conditions and an industrial injury. In
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission the Utah Court of Appeals remanded
the claim and ordered the Commission to apportion the permanent
total disability compensation between the asymptomatic, preexisting
5021594.jae
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conditions and the industrial injury.

Thus, there is a manifest

conflict between these decisions by the Utah Court of Appeals.
In Nyrehn the court found that the critical finding of fact in
a claim that includes a preexisting permanent impairment is whether
the preexisting impairment contributed to the industrial accident,
not whether it was asymptomatic.

The ALJ awarded permanent total

disability benefits to the claimant, but found that the applicant's
preexisting, asymptomatic spondylolisthesis caused

25% of her

permanent impairment and only the impairment in excess of 25% was
compensable.

The Industrial Commission overruled the ALJ and

denied applicant's claim for failure to meet the higher standard of
legal causation required for preexisting injuries by Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986). The court rejected
the Commission's application of a higher legal standard under Allen
on trie grounds that there was no medical evidence that the
asymptomatic, preexisting "condition contributed to the industrial
injury."

800 P.2d at 334 (citations omitted).

The court admonished the Commission and the ALJ to make
express findings of fact on all material issues, particularly
whether the applicant's preexisting condition contributed to her
injury

and

remanded

the claim

for an award

of benefits in

accordance with the allocation of permanent impairment between the
preexisting

and

industrial

injuries on the grounds that the

applicant's claim satisfied the higher standard of legal causation
under the Allen decision.

Id.

In the present case, the Medical Panel made two distinct
findings of fact that the asymptomatic, preexisting condition
5021594. jae
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contributed to the industrial injury and that the claimant would
not have

had

the

degree

of difficulty

had

he

not had the

developmental abnormality,
Crosland found that § 35-1-66 does not apportion between the
employer

and

the

employee

for

symptoms

resulting

from

one

industrial accident. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. The court noted in
a footnote that apportionment was only allowed between the employer
and the Employer's Compensation Fund [sic] under § 35-1-69. Id. at
n. 6 38.

However, the court failed to recognize that in Utah the

sole basis for apportionment depends on whether the claim is for
permanent

total

apportionment

or

is

permanent

between

partial

the

Reinsurance Fund is irrelevant.

disability.

employee

and

the

Whether
Employers7

The 1988 amendments eliminated

apportionment between the employer and the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund, but had no affect on apportionment. Indeed, the ALT noted in
the conclusions of law that § 35-1-69 required "that the carrier
pay only for the impairment that is related to the industrial
injury, and unfortunately, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund no
longer

is required

to contribute with respect

to impairment

aggravated by the industrial injury." Furthermore, the Utah Court
of Appeals held that the "amendment does more than to [sic] clarify
that

an

employer

preexisting

is

ratable

industrial accident."

free

from

functional

liability
impairment

for
not

an

employee's

caused

by the

The court failed to cite any authority for

this principle and the term "functional" is not part of § 35-1-66.
The assessment of permanent impairment is a medical matter
reserved
5021594. jae
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commissioners.

The extent of a claimant's disability is assessed

by nonmedical means, but interpretations of disability are entirely
different and inapplicable to a statute specifically limited to
"any permanent impairment.11
from

applicant's

In the present case, the "impairment"

preexisting,

asymptomatic

developmental

abnormalities was an express finding of fact by the impartial
Medical Panel.

Section 35-1-66 mentions "disability," but the

statute explicitly states that "compensation may not be paid for
any permanent

impairment that existed prior to an industrial

accident."
ARGUMENT IV
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED UNDER RULE 46(d),
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT
IT IS AN IMPORTANT STATE LAW QUESTION OF FIRST IMPRESSION
Petitioners seek a Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rule 46(d),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on the grounds that the Crosland
opinion is an issue of first impression to this Court and vitally
affects all Utah employers and employees.

Petitioners hereby

incorporate the arguments in the briefs of the Utah Self-Insurers'
Association and The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah.

Indeed,

the fact that a majority of the employers in Utah, through their
representatives,
significant

have

concern

filed

that

amicus

Crosland

curiae
will

briefs

adversely

shows

the

impact the

traditional exposure for workers7 compensation insurers and selfinsurers.
The 1988 amendments did not eliminate apportionment between
preexisting

and industrial

injuries in § 35-1-66.

The 1988

amendment to § 35-1-66 retained the accepted and usual principle
5021594. jae
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first mandated in Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega, 562 P. 2d 617
(Utah 1977), that an employer is not liable for permanent partial
disability compensation attributed to manifested
preexisting conditions.

or quiescent

More recently, in Large v. Industrial

Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah App. 1988), the court noted
that "where the disability is the result of preexisting conditions
and not an industrial accident, a claimant is not entitled to
disability benefits."
The legislative intent for amendment of § 35-1-66 was to
eliminate the liability of the Second Injury Fund for permanent
partial disability compensation, not to transfer liability for
preexisting conditions from the Second Injury Fund to the employer.
(See affidavit of Stuart L. Poelman attached in Appendix "D.")
The

Industrial

Commission

cannot

consistently

apply the

redefined terms "any permanent impairment" as required by the
Crosland decision in the three areas that rely on the identical
terms:

§§ 3 5-1-66 and 69, for permanent total and permanent

partial disability, and claims under the higher standard of legal
causation under Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d at 15.
After Crosland, the Commission must apply different meanings for
"any permanent impairment" for the higher legal causation analysis,
and

the

permanent

compensation.

total

and

permanent

partial

disability

Under Crosland, the higher legal causation test

cannot be triggered

for asymptomatic, preexisting conditions.

Similarly, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund may now allege that the
definition

of

"permanent

impairment" entitles

the Employers'

Reinsurance Fund to refuse to reimburse insurers in permanent total
5021594. jae
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disability claims where there is evidence of any asymptomatic,
preexisting condition.
medical

term

These different definitions for the same

of art will

confusion, and litigation.
these other contexts

lead to unnecessary

inconsistency,

If the Crosland definition is used in

employers will be

inequitably

asked to

shoulder exorbitant disability awards and the whole nature of how
employers do business in Utah will be changed. Utah employers may
attempt

to

hire

workers

without

asymptomatic,

preexisting

impairments in direct contravention of Holloway v. Industrial
Commission and other decisions by the Utah Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The Workers' Compensation Act mandates that an employer is
only liable for permanent impairment attributed to an industrial
accident, not for preexisting permanent impairment.

The ALT and

Industrial Commission must merely make findings of fact that any
asymptomatic,
contributory.

preexisting

impairment

was

permanent

and

In the present case, there were express findings

that the preexisting, asymptomatic developmental abnormalities in
claimant's spine were permanent and contributory.

Section 35-1-66

does not expressly or impliedly require "functional" or "disabling"
impairment and the Utah Court of Appeals improperly redefined the
statute contrary to the expert medical evidence and the Guides to
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Disability is assessed by
nonmedical

means

and the court would

have been

entitled to

interject itself in the interpretation of claimant's disability.
However, under the Guides impairment is a medical matter that is
assessed exclusively by medical means and the court improperly
5021594. jae
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substituted its definition of the term "impairment" for the precise
meaning used by the Panel. Applicant should have objected to the
Report of Medical Panel in the event he disagreed with the Panel's
findings.
Pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, § 35-1-66,
petitioners are only liable for applicant's permanent impairment in
excess of the ten percent permanent impairment that the Medical
Panel found existed prior to the industrial accident.
Petitioners are entitled to a Writ of Certiorari under Rule
46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on the grounds that Crosland
directly conflicts with decisions by the Utah Supreme Court and the
Utah Court of Appeals.
the

traditional

In addition, Crosland drastically alters

rule

that

the

employer

is

not

liable

for

preexisting conditions in accordance with sound public policy to
hire impaired workers.
WHEREFORE, petitioners, Young Electric Sign Co. and Smith
Administrators, now doing business as Administrative Services,
Inc. , respectfully request that the decision Crosland v. Industrial
Commission

be

reversed

and

that

the

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law of the ALJ and Industrial Commission of Utah be
affirmed.
DATED this ^

day of

May, 1992.

J.LXngus Edwards
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C.
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proficient in his work. General
knowledge or expertise acquired
through employment in a common
calling cannot be appropriated as a
trade secret. "The efficiency and
skills which an employee develops
through his work belong to him and
not to his former employer." Hallmark Personnel of Texas, Inc. v.
Franks, Tex. Cr. App. 562 S.W.2d
933, 936 (1978). The same principles
apply to the covenant here. We
hold that the covenant not to
compete had the effect of preventing the defendant from exploiting
skills and experience which he had a
right to exploit.
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 628 (footnote omitted).
The trial court and the majority ignore the
fundamental policy on which Finlay rested. If
the trial court had correctly applied Finlay to
the facts of this case, Kasco could not have
made the requisite showing under Rule
65A(e)(l) that it was entitled to the relief
demanded. Finlay requires that before a trial
court can conclude that a covenant not to
compete is enforceable, it must first determine
that the employee was not engaged in a
common calling and that the employer has a
legally protectible interest. Finlay, 645 P.2d at
627. A generalized assertion that preventing
the completion of a former employee will
protect the employer's goodwill is not enough.
Id. at 627-28; System Concepts, 669 P.2d at
426.
In this case, defendant Larry Benson was a
salesman of butcher supplies. He was a route
salesman, pure and simple. He covered a rural
territory in Utah and Idaho. He had no trade
secrets. He was not involved in management.
As a result of his common calling, he necessarily knew both the actual and potential customers for the goods he sold in the communities of his territory. Customers of butcher
supplies in such areas are not hard to find; a
scan of local telephone books would quickly
identify them. Finally, Kasco's customers are
not found on a secret customer list.
The majority does not even address the issue
of whether Benson was engaged in a common
calling. It rests solely on the specious rationale
that in his territory, Benson was Kasco. Route
salespersons are commonly viewed in their
territories as representatives of their employers. But that is no reason to hold them in
semi-bondage to their former employers
when they change jobs. The majority notes
that Benson was one of Kasco's top five salespersons. The law, however, does not protect
only less able individuals.
The consequence of the majority's ruling is
that a noncompetition covenant may be enforced against any route salesperson whenever
it could be said that the employer may lose

~-

lv. Reo. 35

££

some sales, i.e., "goodwill," if the former
employee is not restrained from competing.
That, of course, can be said with respect to all
route salespersons, no matter how common
their callings.
Durham, Justice, concurs in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart.
1. Clearly, the terms of an injunction may be modified after it goes into effect. However, the law is
that a movant must first show some change in circumstances. Kasco has not alleged any changed circumstances that bear upon the issue of when the
injunction should have commenced.
2. In Rose Park, the employee enjoined was a professional person solely responsible for building the
business of a small neighborhood pharmacy.

Cite as

183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Gary E. CROSLAND,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW of the Industrial
Commission of Utah; Young Electric Sign
Co.; and Smith Administrators,
Respondents.
No. 910291-CA
FILED: March 20, 1992
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Virginius Dabncy, Salt Lake City, for
Petitioner
J. Angus Edwards, Salt Lake City, for
Respondents
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
JACKSON, Judge:
Petitioner, Gary Crosland (Crosland), seeks
review of an Industrial Commission order
awarding him compensation for one-half of
his industrial accident injury and denying
compensation for the remainder. Crosland was
denied compensation for the half of the injury
that ensued from the accident's aggravation of
a preexisting asymptomatic condition. We
reverse.

BACKGROUND
On February 9, 1989, Crosland injured his
lower back as he attempted to help another
employee move a 200-pound sign while
working for Respondent, Young Electric Sign
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Company. Crosland felt immediate pain when, there is "a grant of discretion to the agency
moving the sign around the corner, he twisted concerning the language in question, either
his upper torso. When he could barely walk expressly made in the statute or implied from
the next day at work, his employer sent him the statutory language."2 Id. at 589. When
for medical treatment. Crosland's treating legislative intent can be discerned, however,
physician concluded that Crosland had a pre- we give the agency's interpretation no deferexisting asymptomatic defect and that the ence, id.; accord Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board of
industrial accident caused the defect to become Review, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App.
acute and symptomatic. The insurance adju- 1991). This case requires an interpretation of
ster's examining physician determined that the 1988 amendment to the Workers' CompCrosland had preexisting, asymptomatic spo- ensation Act and thus presents a question of
ndylolysis (breaking down or dissolution of statutory construction and legislative intent
the body of the vertebra) and spondylolisthesis which we may review foir correctness. Under
(forward movement of the body of one of the this higher standard, to afford relief we must
lower lumbar vertebrae on the vertebra below find that the Commission erroneously interpit), adding that all the present symptoms reted the law to Crosland's substantial prejCrosland suffered were related to the indust- udice.
rial injury. Crosland had never had any back
ANALYSIS
problems or required medical treatment for his
The parties agree that Crosland suffered an
back prior to this accident.
The medical panel appointed by the Admi- industrial injury and that he has satisfied both
nistrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that follo- the medical and legal cause requirements of
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15
wing the accident, Crosland had a twenty Allen v. Industrial
3
(Utah
1986).
The
sole
issue on appeal is
percent permanent partial impairment of the
whole body. The panel attributed half, or ten - whether Crosland should receive compensation
percent, permanent partial impairment, to the for the ten percent asymptomatic preexisting
industrial accident and half to the asympto- condition which was aggravated by his indusmatic preexisting condition medically aggrav- trial accident and contributed to the injury.
ated by the accident. The panel commented Utah courts have followed the wellthat "[i]t is entirely possible he could have established common law rule that when an
gone on for an indefinite period had it not industrial accident lights up or aggravates a
been for the event described, but it is unlikely preexisting deficiency or disease, the resulting
he would have had the degree of difficulty had disability is compensable as long as the induhe not had the developmental abnormality." strial accident was the medical and legal cause
Based on this evaluation, the ALJ denied of the injury. Nuzum v. Roosendahl Const,
Crosland compensation for the ten percent and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah
permanent partial impairment attributable to 1977); Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (modifying Nuzum
the preexisting asymptomatic condition aggr- to add the higher standard for legal
avated by the industrial accident, thus allo- cause when preexisting conditions are invowing compensation only for the ten percent lved); Virgin v. Board of Review of the Indus.
whole body permanent partial impairment Comm% 803 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Utah App.
attributable to the industrial accident itself. 1990); see also Giles v. Industrial Comm'n,
692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984) (employee received
The Industrial Commission affirmed.
Crosland appeals, arguing that he should compensation for detached retina resulting
receive compensation for the entire twenty from work-related accident, even though
percent whole person permanent partial imp- employee's prior cataract surgery rendered
airment caused by the industrial accident's him somewhat predisposed to retinal detachaggravation of the preexisting asymptomatic ment). This rule is consistent with the stated
policy of liberally construing and applying the
condition.
Utah Workers' Compensation Act to provide
coverage, accomplishing the Act's purpose of
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This proceeding is governed by the Utah | affording financial security to injured emploAdministrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah yees. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial
Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to-22 (1989 & ! Comm% 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984)
Supp. 1991).* Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) (citation omitted). In addition, the rule comgoverns the scope of our review of the Indu- I ports with Professor Larson's comments:
strial Commission's order, allowing relief if
Nothing is better established in
Crosland has been "substantially prejudiced"
compensation law than the rule
because "the agency has erroneously interprthat, when industrial injury precieted or applied the law." In Morton Int'l, Inc.
pitates disability from a latent prior
v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax
condition, such as heart disease,
Comm% 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah 1991),
cancer, back weakness and the like,
the supreme court held that under this section
the entire disability is compensable,
we may review for correctness and need not
and except in states having special
defer to the agency's interpretation unless
—
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statutes on aggravation of disease,
no attempt is made to weigh the
relative contribution of the accident
and the preexisting condition to the
final disability or death. Apportionment does not apply in such cases,
nor in any case in which the prior
condition was not a disability in the
compensation sense.
2 Larson, Workmen*s Compensation Law,
§59.22(a) (1989) (footnotes omitted).
Juxtaposed against this strong common law
background allowing an employee compensation for aggravation of a preexisting latent
condition is the policy of freeing an employer
from liability for an employee disability existing prior to the work-related accident. For
permanent partial impairments, this policy is
effectuated by the medical and legal causation
requirements of Allen.4 In addition, by amendment effective July 1, 1988, the legislature
added the following language to the Workers'
Compensation Act: "Permanent partial disability compensation may not be paid for anypermanent impairment that existed prior to an
industrial accident/ Utah Code Ann. §35-166 (1988) (emphasis added). We are now called
upon to decide whether the asymptomatic
weakness in Crosland's back was a
"permanent impairment" within the meaning
of the statute at the time of the injury.5 The
stated purpose of this amendment to section
35-1-66 is to clarify "that permanent partial
disability compensation entitlements are based
on physical impairment caused by an industrial accident." Laws of Utah ch. 116 H.B. no.
218 preamble. Crosland urges us to interpret
the term "permanent impairment" to exclude
asymptomatic conditions such as his and to
include only conditions "[connoting] some
deterioration or diminishment in function."
This definition comports with the use of the
word "permanent impairment" at the beginning of amended section 35-1-66, stating,
with our emphasis, that an employee who
receives a "permanent impairment as a result
of an industrial accident ... may receive a
permanent partial disability award." This
wording implies functional "permanent impairment" and does not include asymptomatic
nonratable conditions.
This interpretation is also in line with decisions in other states, which have allowed for
compensation under similar statutes. Alabama
courts, for example, have refused to require
employees to accept reduced compensation for
injuries resulting from aggravation of preexisting conditions. See, e.g., International Paper
Co. v. Rogers, 500 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1986) (construing term "infirmity"
in statute similar to Utah's to allow unreduced
compensation for employee with preexisting
asymptomatic spondylolisthesis: "[i]t is a
fundamental principle that an employer take[s]

37

the employee subject to his physical condition
when he starts his employment"); see also Terwilliger v. Green Fuel Economizer, Inc.,
468 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 1983) (no
apportionment when preexisting condition was
dormant and not disabling); Daniels v. State

Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 294
S.E.2d 184, 188 (W. Va. 1982) (under state
apportionment statute, preexisting impairment
must be definitely ascertained and rated;
general rule is that apportionment statutes do
not apply when "the prior condition was not
physically disabling").
Like other states, Utah has not apportioned
between the employer and the employee liability for symptoms resulting from one industrial accident.6 We find no reason to conclude
that section 35-1-66 as amended requires
apportionment of liability for aggravation of
an asymptomatic condition. Nor do we find
that the amendment does more than to clarify
that an employer is free from liability for an
employee's preexisting ratable functional
impairment not caused by the industrial accident. Based on the usage of the term
"permanent impairment" in the statute, and
on Utah case law at the time of the injury,
which allowed full compensation for aggravation of a preexisting asymptomatic condition,
we believe the term "permanent impairment"
should be interpreted to refer to a ratable
physical condition exhibiting some diminished
function. Because Crosland's back was completely functional prior to the industrial accident and could have continued to be functional absent the accident, we conclude that
apportionment was inappropriate in this case
and that the Commission erroneously failed to
award full compensation for Crosland's
twenty percent whole person permanent partial
impairment caused by the industrial accident.
We reverse the order of the Industrial Commission.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge

1. The UAPA governs all administrative proceedings
commenced after January 1,1988.
2. A legislative grant of discretion might be implied
when the terms of the statute leave the specific
question at issue unresolved, allowing for more than
one permissible reading of the statute. The choice
among permissible interpretations might then be
deemed a policy choice for the agency, and we
would not substitute our judgment absent an abuse
of the delegated discretion. Morton InVl, 814 P.2d
at 587-89.
3. To prove legal cause under the higher standard of
Allen, a claimant with a preexisting condition which
contributes to the injury must show that his workrelated exertion was unusual or extraordinary, in
excess of the normally expected level of nonemployment activity for men and women in the latter half
of the twentieth century. Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-26.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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If the claimant has no contributory preexisting
condition, a usual or ordinary exertion suffices to
prove legal cause. Id. (citing IB Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law §38.83(a) & (b) (1991)). That
Crosland's exertion in lifting the sign was greater
than normal is undisputed in this case. Consequently, we need not evaluate the application of the Allen
rule under the amended statute.
4. For permanent total disabilities, the policy is
accomplished by providing the employer contribution from the Employers' Compensation Fund. See
note 6.
5. A 1991 amendment to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act defines the terms "impairment" and
"disability." "'Disability' means becoming medically impaired as to function." Utah Code Ann. §351-44(4) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
"'Impairment' is a purely medical condition reflecting any anatomical or functional abnormality or
loss." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-44(6) (Supp. 1991)
(emphasis added). Because these statutory definitions were not in effect at the time of Crosland's
injury, we need not decide their applicability to the
wording of the 1988 amendment. Instead we rely on
the law as it existed at the time of the injury.
6. Apportionment has only occurred between the
employer and the Employers' Compensation Fund
under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (1988), which,
with our emphasis, states in pertinent pan,
If an employee, who has at least a 10%
whole person permanent impairment
from any cause or origin, subsequently
incurs an additional impairment by an
accident arising out of and in the course
of the employee's employment, and if
the additional impairment results in
permanent total disability, the employer
or its insurance carrier and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for
the payment of benefits as follows:...
This provision thus fully compensates an employee
when an industrial accident and a preexisting impairment result in permanent total disability, without
imposing the complete burden of compensation for
the total disability on the employer. The purpose of
this statutory scheme appears to be to resolve the
problems arising when the sum of two injuries is
greater than the parts (e.g., an industrial accident
resulting in blindness in one eye of a worker already
blind in the other eye, thus creating permanent total
disability), without discouraging employers from
hiring handicapped persons. The employee is compensated for the permanent total disability, but the
employer is partially compensated from the fund so
that the cost to the employer is not as severe. E.g.,
Hall v. Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 175, 178
(Utah 1985) (under this section, a showing of causal
connection between the preexisting impairment and
the industrial injury is not required; only that they
cumulatively result in substantially greater disability); see 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,
§59.31(a) (1989). In making its apportioned award,
the Commission relied upon Nyrehn v. Industrial
Conwn'fl, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990), cert.
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). This reliance is
misplaced because the Nyrehn cast merely apportions between the employer and the fund under this
section and does not address the issue of apportionment between the employer and the employee.

Cite as

183 Utah Adv. Rep. 38
IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
Louise D. STROLLO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
David STROLLO,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 910237-CA
FILED: March 23, 1992
Third District, Tooele County
Honorable David S. Young
ATTORNEYS:
David G. Challed, Salt Laike City, for
Appellant
David Strollo, Tooele, Appellee Pro Se
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding JudgePlaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of a
protective order under the Cohabitant Abuse
Act, claiming the trial court erred in requiring
her to demonstrate immediate peril. We
reverse.
On February 21, 1991, plaintiff filed a
complaint pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§30-6-1 to-11
(1989 & Supp. 1991), and requested an ex
parte protective order. Plaintiffs pro se
complaint stated defendant, threatened to kill
her if she served him with divorce papers.
On February 28, 1991, both parties appeared in court without counsel. The judge
stated that he had reviewed the complaint
seeking a protective order. Before hearing any
testimony, the judge stated he was going to
dismiss the complaint. Explaining his decision,
the judge continued:
I understand that you may be in
fear, but this is an improper use of
the protective order. The protective
order is intended to cover those
circumstances where one is in, what
we call imminent fear. An imminent
fear doesn't mean that you may
anticipate some future problem. It
means that you are in fear of some
present problem. That is if there is
an immediate threat. This threat is
based upon your fear that if you
file divorce papers that you may be
in jeopardy. You have every right
to file divorce papers. You have
every right in that proceeding to
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not it would need additional employees, would
perform the work in the normal course of its
trade or business.
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing,
improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence
that he owns or is in the process of acquiring as
his personal residence may not be considered an
employee or employer solely by operation of Subsection (a).
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a
sole proprietorship may not be considered an employee under Subsection (a) if:
(i) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a); or
(ii) the person is included as an employee
under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide
adequate payment of direct compensation,
which failure is attributable to an act or
omission over which the person had or
shared control or responsibility.
(f) For purposes of Subsection (e)(ii):
(i) a partner of a partnership and an
owner of a sole proprietorship are presumed
to have had or shared control or responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation, the burden of proof being on any person
seeking to establish the contrary; and
(ii) evidence affirmatively establishing
that a partner of a partnership or an owner
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control
or responsibility for any failure to insure or
otherwise provide adequate payment of direct compensation may only be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
(g) A director or officer of a corporation may
not be considered an employee under Subsection
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(b).
1968
35-1-43.

"Employee," "worker" or "workmen,"
and "operative" defined — Mining les-

438

the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar
work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance premium for that type of work.
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may
elect to include as an employee under this chapter any partner of the partnership or the owner of
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve
written notice upon its insurance carrier and
upon the commission naming the persons to be
covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of
a sole proprietorship is considered an employee
under this chapter until this notice has been
given. For premium rate making, the insurance
carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the
employee to be 150% of the state's average
weekly wage.
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any
director or officer of the corporation as an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes
this election, it shall serve written notice upon
its insurance carrier and upon the commission
naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this chapter until this
notice has been given.
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker"
or "workman," and "operative" do not include a real
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for
a real estate broker if:
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's
or associated broker's income for services is from
real estate commissions;
(b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are performed under a written contract specifying that the real estate agent is an
independent contractor; and
(c) the contract states that the real estate
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as
an employee for federal income tax purposes.

sees and sublessees — Partners and
sole proprietors — Corporate officers
and directors — Real estate agents and
brokers.
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 35-1-44. Definition of terms.
The following terms as used in this title shall be
or "workmen," and "operative" mean:
(a) each elective and appointive officer and construed as follows:
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the avany other person, in the service of the state, or of
erage weekly earnings arrived at by the rules
any county, city, town, or school district within
provided in Section 35-1-75.
the state, serving the state, or any county, city,
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of
town, or school district under any election or apthe commission as to the amount of compensation
pointment, or under any contract of hire, express
due any injured, or the dependents of any deor implied, written or oral, including each officer
ceased, employee.
and employee of the state institutions of learning; and
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and
benefits provided for in this title.
(b) each person in the service of any employer,
as defined in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically immore workers or operatives regularly in the same
paired as to function. Disability can be total or
business, or in or about the same establishment,
partial, temporary or permanent, industrial or
under any contract of hire, express or implied,
nonindustrial.
oral or written, including aliens and minors,
(5) "General order" means an order applyinS
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but
generally throughout the state to all persons, emnot including any person whose employment is
ployments, or places of employment of a class uncasual and not in the usual course of the trade,
der the jurisdiction of the commission. All other
business, or occupation of his employer.
orders of the commission shall be considered spe(2) Unless a lessee
provides
as Hunter
an emcialJ. Reuben
orders.Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized
by thecoverage
Howard W.
Law Library,
ployer under this chapter, any lesseeMachine-generated
in mines or of OCR, may(6)
"Impairment"
is a purely medical condition
contain
errors.
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m ality or loss. Impairment may be either temporary o r permanent, industrial or nonindustrial.
(7) "Order" means any decision, rule, regulation, direction, requirement or standard of the
commission, or any other determination arrived
a t, or decision made, by the commission.
(8) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of employment" includes any injury caused by t h e willful act of
a third person directed against an employee
because of his employment.
(b) The term does not include a disease,
except as t h e disease results from the injury.
(9) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment or place of employment, means t h e
freedom from danger to the life, health, or welfare of employees reasonably permitted by the
nature of t h e employment.
(10) "Welfare" means comfort, decency, and
moral well-being.
iwi

j5_l45. Compensation for industrial accidents
to be paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
;njured and the dependents of each such employee
*ho is killed, by accident arising out of and in the
.t>urse of his employment, wherever such injury ocrjrred, if the accident was not purposely self-indicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained
?n account of the injury or death, and such amount
tor medical, nurse, and hospital services and medinnes, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
fipenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsiMlity for compensation and payment of medical,
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be
>n the employer and its insurance carrier and not on
:he employee.
1988
JS-146. Employers to secure workers* compensation benefits for employees —
Methods — Failure — Notice — Injunction — Violation.
<1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns,
ind school districts, shall secure the payment of
workers' compensation benefits for their employees:
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments
shall commence within 30 days after any final
award by the commission;
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any final award by
the commission; or
(c) by furnishing annually to t h e commission
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct
compensation in the amount, in t h e manner, and
when due as provided for in this title, which payments shall commence within 30 days after any
anal award by the commission. In these cases t h e
commission may in its discretion require the deposit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to
secure the payment of compensation liabilities as
they are incurred, and may a t amy time change or
Modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if
in its judgment this action is necessary or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with
*H the provisions of law relating to the payment

of compensation and t h e furnishing of medical
nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and burial expenses to injured employees and to t h e dependents of killed employees. The commission
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privilege as a self-insurer.
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin
any employer, within the provisions of this chapter,
from further operation of the employer's business,
where the employer has failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in
this section. Upon a showing of failure to so provide,
the court shall enjoin t h e further operation of t h e
employer's business until the payment of these benefits has been secured by t h e employer as required by
this section. The court may enjoin the employer without requiring bond from t h e commission.
(3) If the commission h a s reason to believe that a n
employer of one or more employees is conducting a
business without securing t h e payment of compensation in one of the three ways provided in this section,
the commission may give such employer five days'
written notice by registered mail of such noncompliance and if the employer within said period does not
remedy such default, the commission may file suit as
provided in this section and the court is empowered,
ex parte, to issue without bond a temporary injunction restraining the further operation of t h e employer's business.
1989
35-1-46.10. Notice of n o n c o m p l i a n c e t o e m ployer — Enforcement power of commission — Penalty.
(1) In addition to the remedies specified in Section
35-1-46, if the commission h a s reason to believe t h a t
an employer of one or more employees is conducting
business without securing the payment of benefits in
one of the three ways provided in Section 35-1-46, t h e
commission may give that employer written notice of
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known
address of the employer.
(2) If t h e employer does not remedy the default
within 15 days after delivery of this notice, t h e commission may issue an order requiring the employer to
appear before the commission and show cause why
the employer should not be ordered to comply with
the provisions of Section 35-1-46.
(3) If it is found t h a t t h e employer h a s failed to
provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three
ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the commission
may order any employer to comply with t h e provisions of Section 35-1-46.
(4) The conunission may also impose, a t the time of
the hearing, a penalty against the employer of not
more t h a n one and one-half times the amount of t h e
premium t h e employer would have paid for workers'
compensation insurance had that employer been insured by t h e Workers' Compensation Fund of U t a h
during t h e period of noncompliance.
(5) This penalty shall be deposited in t h e Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Section 35-1-107
and used for the purposes of t h a t fund.
1987
35-1-46.20. Requirements of a n y order of t h e
commission — Court enforcement
Any order issued by t h e commission under authority of Section 35-1-46.10 shall be in writing, shall be
sent by registered mail to t h e last known address of
the employer, and shall state t h e findings and order
of the commission. The order shall specify its effective
date, which may be immediate or may be a t a later
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shall also be payable for the first three
-lion
1973
2ter the injury is received.
- Temporary disability — Amount of
payments — State average weekly
wage defined.
In case of temporary disability, the employee
v
receive 662/a% of that employee's average
*zl\ wages at the time of the injury so long as such
h lity is total, but not more than a maximum of
-of the state average weekly wage at the time of
: X>r
' jury per week and not less than a minimum of
**Vn<!r week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5
Bch dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
* 'maximum of four such dependent children, not to
* * J the average weekly wage of the employee at
#s
*\jjne °f t n e in J urv » D u t n o t to e x c e e d 100% of the
** average weekly wage at the time of the injury
** week. In no case shall such compensation benefits
^ e d 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state
rtge weekly wage at the time of the injury over a
Lflod of eight years from the date of the injury.
In the event a light duty medical release is obujned prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of
^very, and when no such light duty employment is
mailable to the employee from the employer, temponr\ disability benefits shall continue to be paid.
•2i The "state average weekly wage** as referred to
n Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined
Zy the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of
^ch year, the total wages reported on contribution
rrports to the department of employment security unitr the commission for the preceding calendar year
ihall be divided by the average monthly number of
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding year by
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall
he divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used
is the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelvemonth period commencing July 1 following the June
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom.
**

1961

35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability —
Amount of payments.
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability
for work, the employee shall receive weekly compensation equal to:
(a) 662/a% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the accident and the weekly wages the employee is able
to earn after the accident, but not more than
100% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of injury; plus
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent children, but
only up to a total weekly compensation that does
not exceed 100% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of injury.
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior to
e
ight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
(a) whose physical condition resulting from
the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight
years after the date of injury; and
(b) who files an application for hearing under
Section 35-1-98.

(3) The duration oi weemy payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years
after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate
when the disability ends or the injured employee dies.
1990

35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of
payments.
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial accident and who
files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-98
may receive a permanent partial disability award
from the commission.
Weekly payments may not in any case continue
after the disability ends, or the death of the injured
person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 662/a% of that employee's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more
than a maximum of 662/s% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four
dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week, to be paid in routine pay periods not to
exceed four weeks for the number of weeks stated
against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation provided for temporary
total disability and temporary partial disability:
For the loss of:
Number of Weeks
(A) Upper extremity
(1) Arm
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter
amputation)
218
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above
deltoid insertion
187
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and
elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below
elbow joint proximal to insertion of
biceps tendon
178
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal
to insertion of biceps tendon
168
(2) Hand
(2)(a) At wrist or midcarpal
or
midmetacarpal amputation
168
(2Kb) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joint
101
(3) Thumb
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or
with resection of carpometacarpal
bone
67
(b) At interphalangeal joint
50
(4) Index finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or
with resection of metacarpal bone ... .42
(b) At proximal
interphalangeal
joint
34
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint. .18
(5) Middle finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or
with resection of metacarpal bone ....34
(b) At proximal
interphalangeal
joint
27
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint. .15
(6) Ring finger
(a) At interphalangeal joint or with
resection of metacarpal bone
17
(b) At proximal
interphalangeal
joint
13
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint... 8
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(7) Little finger
of 662/3% of the state average weekly wage attk
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or
time of the injury for a total of 312 weeki
with resection of metacarpal bone
8
compensation be required to be paid.
*
(b) At proximal
interphalangeal
joint
6 35-1-66.1. Loss of hearing — Occupational he*
ing loss due to noise to be comp^
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint... 4
sated.
(B) Lower extremity
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposun t.
(1) Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pel- harmful industrial noise or by direct head inj^
vis)
156 shall be compensated according to the terms and cat
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or ditions of this chapter.
(2) No claim for compensation for hearing loss fo
less below tuberosity of ischium
125
(c) Leg above knee with functional harmful industrial noise shall be paid under tL
stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes am- chapter unless it can be demonstrated by a prof*
putation or below knee with short stump sionally controlled sound test that the employee h*
(three inches or less below intercondylar been exposed to harmful industrial noise as define
notch)
112 in Section 35-1-66.2 while employed by the employ*
j*
(d) Leg below knee with functional against whom the claim is made.
stump
88 35-1-66*2. Harmful industrial noise defined.
(2) Foot
(1) Harmful industrial noise is defined as ti>
(a) Footatankle
88 sound emanating from equipment and machines dur
(b) Foot partial amputation (Cho- ing employment exceeding the following permissibU
part's)
66 sound levels, dBA slow response, and corresponding
(c) Foot midmetatarsal
durations per day, in hours:
amputation
44
(3) Toes
Sound
Duration
(a) Great toe
Level
(i) With resection of metatarsal
90.
8
bone
26
2.
6
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal
4
95.
joint
16
97.
3
(iii) At interphalangeal joint ..12
2
100.
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th)
102.
1.4
(i) With resection of metatarsal
105.
1.0
bone
4
0.5
110.
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal
115
0.25orle»
joint
3
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal
(2) Harmful industrial noise is also defined i»
joint
2 sound that results in acoustic trauma such as sudder
(iv) At distal interphalangeal instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or im
joint
1 pact noise exceeding 140 dB peak sound pressure
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal levels.
joint
26
(3) The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Divi
(4) Miscellaneous
sion of the commission may conduct tests to deter
(a) One eye by enucleation
120 mine the intensity of noise at places of employment
(b) Total blindness of one eye
100 The administrative law judge may consider such
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing . 109 tests, and any other tests taken by authorities in w
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall field of sound engineering, as evidence of harmful
be deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Par- industrial noise.
xm
tial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the mem- 35-1-66.3. Loss of hearing defined.
ber. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to
Loss of hearing is defined as binaural hearing to*
the items listed in (B)(4).
measured in decibels with frequencies of 500, 1,0ftFor any permanent impairment caused by an 2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz). If the aver
industrial accident that is not otherwise provided age decibel loss at 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 cycle*
for in the schedule of losses in this section, per- per second (Hertz) is 25 decibels or less, usually no
l
manent partial disability compensation shall be hearing impairment exists.
*
awarded by the commission based on the medical
evidence. Compensation for any such impairment 35-1-66.4. Measuring hearing loss.
. .
shall, as closely as possible, be proportionate to
(1) The degree of hearing loss shall be established
the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this no sooner than six weeks after termination of exposection. Permanent partial disability compensa- sure to the harmful industrial noise, by audiometry
tion may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, determination of hearing threshold level perfornI
which shall be considered the period of compen- by medical or paramedical professionals recogni
sation for permanent total loss of bodily function. by the commission, as measured from 0 decibels on
Permanent partial disability compensation may audiometer calibrated to ANSI-S3.6-1969, America"
not be paid for any permanent impairment that National Standard "Specifications for Audiometer*
by the Howard W.
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
existed prior to an industrialDigitized
accident.
(1969).
. BYU.
may contain
errors.
The amounts specified in this section are allMachine-generated
(2) In any OCR,
evaluation
of occupational
hearing J^

cemed do not exceed the maximum provided for
by law.
1990
35.1-69. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
If an employee, who has at least a 10% whole pergon permanent impairment from any cause or origin,
subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, and if the additional impairment results in permanent total disability, the employer or its insurance carrier and the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund are liable for the payment of benefits as follows:
(1) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the first $20,000 of medical benefits and
the initial three years of permanent total disability compensation as provided in this title.
(2) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of
the first $20,000 shall be paid in the first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier.
Then, as provided in Subsection (5), the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse the
employer or its insurance carrier for 50% of those
expenses.
(3) After the initial three-year period under
Subsection (1) permanent total disability compensation payable to an employee under this title
becomes the liability of and shall be paid by the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
(4) If it is determined that the employee is permanently and totally disabled, the employer or
its insurance carrier shall be given credit for all
prior payments of temporary total, temporary
partial, and permanent partial disability compensation made as a result of the industrial accident. Any overpayment by the employer or its
insurance carrier shall be reimbursed by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund under Subsection (6).
(5) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse
the employer or its insurance carrier for the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's share of medical
benefits and compensation paid to or on behalf of
an employee. A request for Employers' Reinsurance Fund reimbursements shall be accompanied
by satisfactory evidence of payment of the medical or disability compensation for which the reimbursement is requested. Each request is subject to review as to reasonableness by the commission. The commission may determine the
manner of reimbursement.
(6) If, at the time an employee is determined to
be permanently and totally disabled, the employee has other actionable workers' compensation claims, the employer or insurance carrier
that is liable for the last industrial accident resulting in permanent total disability shall be liable for the benefits payable by the employer as
provided in this section. The employee's entitlement to benefits for prior actionable claims shall
then be determined separately on the facts of
those claims. Any previous permanent partial
disability arising out of those claims shall then
be considered to be impairments that give rise to
Employers' Reinsurance Fund liability under
this section.
isss
&1-70. Additional benefits in special cases.
h* any wholly dependent persons, who have been
g i v i n g the benefits of this title, at the termination
of
such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and

under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled
to additional benefits, the industrial commission
may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability of the employer or insurance
carrier involved shall not be extended, and the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special
fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section
35-1-68.
i9ss
35-1-71. Dependents — Presumption.
The following persons shall be presumed to be
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
(1) Children under the age of 18 years, or over
if physically or mentally incapacitated and dependent upon the parent, with whom they are
living at the time of the death of such parent, or
who is legally bound for their support.
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under
Subsection 35-l-68(2)(a)(i), a surviving husband
or wife shall be presumed to be wholly dependent
upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the
time of the employee's death.
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in
whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance
with the facts in each particular case existing at the
time of the injury or death of such employee, except
for purposes of dependency reviews under Subsection
35-l-68(2)(a)(iii). No person shall be considered as a
dependent unless he or she is a member of the family
of the deceased employee, or bears the relation of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother
or sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall
include a posthumous child, and a child legally
adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half
sisters shall be included in the words "brother or Bister" as above used.
1967
35-1-72. Alien.
When any alien dependent of the deceased resides
outside of the United States of America and any of its
dependencies and Canada, such dependent shall be
paid not to exceed one-half the amount provided herein.
1953
35-1-73. Benefits in case of death — Distribution
of award to dependents — Death of dependents — Remarriage of surviving
spouse.
The benefits in case of death shall be paid to such
one or more of the dependents of the decedent for the
benefit of all the dependents, as may be determined
by the commission, which may apportion the benefits
among the dependents in such manner as it deems
just and equitable. Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be made, if the commission deems
it proper, and shall operate to discharge all other
claims therefor. The dependents, or persons to whom
benefits are paid, shall apply the same to the use of
the several beneficiaries thereof in compliance with
the finding and direction of the commission. In all
cases of death where the dependents are a surviving
spouse and one or more minor children, it shall be
sufficient for the widow or widower to make application to the commission on behalf of that individual
and the minor children; and in cases where all of the
dependents are minors, the application shall be made
by the guardian or next friend of such minor dependents. The commission may, for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of any minor dependents it deems incapable of doing so, provide a
method of safeguarding any payments due them.
Should any dependent of a deceased employee die
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American Medical Association

Chapter 1

Concepts
of Impairment
Evaluation
1 0 Introduction
he AMA Guides to the Evaluation ofPermanent
Impairment (the Guide?) provides a reference
framework within which physicians may evaluate and report medical impairment and within which
nonmedical recipients of information about impairment
may understand and make appropriate use of the medical information they receive
The unique value of the Guides as /^technical
reference of choice for evaluation of medical impairment, which goes well beyond its broad scope of coverage (all body parts and systems), arises from the precise
application of fundamental medical and scientific
concepts, the systematic analysis that introduces each
of the clinical chapters, the detail of the medical evaluation protocols, and the thorough state-of-the-art analyses that underlie the rating tables In addition, a format
for reports is described in Chapter 2 and summarized
at the beginning of each clinical chapter to provide
straightforward and well-structured guidelines so that
reports about the same individual from different observers are likely to be of comparable content and completeness and may, therefore, be more easily analyzed
and compared
As is true of any other technical process, knowing
the "rules," which in the case of the Guides are the
specific procedures described in the clinical chapters,
is not enough The user of the Guides, both physicians
and nonphysicians alike, must understand the concepts
under which the "rules have been developed and the
intended approach for using them to achieve objective,

T

accurate, fair, and reproducible evaluations of individuals with medical impairment This chapter and Chapter
2 will enable the user to become familiar with the
techniques and approach to evaluation of impairment
embodied in the Guides

1.1 Basic Considerations
Impairment—Disability—Handicap
Various terms used in the Guides, such as "impairment,"
"disability" and "handicap," appear m laws, regulations
and policies of diverse origin without prior coordination of the ways in which they are used It is no wonder,
then, that there is uncertainty, if not controversy, about
their meaning The definitions used in the Guides seek
to remedy this confusion through detailed description
and delineation of the domain m which each term is
applied, for it is the characteristics of the domain that
are important, not the word used as the label Accordingly, even when the terminology of the Guides may
differ from or appear to be in conflict with that of a
particular law, regulation or administrative system, analysis of the context in accordance with the following
discussion should reveal how the principles embodied
in the Guides may be interpreted and applied within
the provisions of a particular disability system
The accurate and proper use of medical information to assess impairment in connection with disability
determinations depends on the recognition that, whereas
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impairment is a medical matter, disability arises out
of the interaction between impairment and external
demands. Consequently, as used in the Guides,
"impairment" means an alteration of an individual's
health status that is assessed by medical means', "disability" which is assessed by nonmedical means,
means an alteration of an individual's capacity to meet
personal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet
statutory or regulatory requirements. Simply stated,
"impairment" is what is wrong with the health of an
individual; "disability" is the gap between what the
individual can do and what the individual needs or
wants to do.
An individual who is "impaired" is not necessarily "disabled." Impairment givesriseto disability only
when the medical condition limits the individual's capacity to meet demands that pertain to nonmedical fields
and activities.1 On the other hand, if the individual is
able to meet a particular set of demands, the individual
is not "disabled" with respect to those demands, even
though a medical evaluation may reveal impairment.
The concept of "handicap" is related to, yet independent of, both "impairment" and "disability," although
it is sometimes used interchangeably with either of
these terms. Under the provisions of Federal law,2 an
individual is identified as "handicapped" if that individual has an impairment that substantially limits one
or more life activities, including work, has a record of
such impairment, or is regarded as having such an
impairment3 The terms of this definition are so indefinite and broad that, technically, almost any person who
desires to do so might be included in the class of the
handicapped under the law.
As a matter of practicality, however, a "handicap"
may be operationally understood as being manifest in
association with a "barrier" or obstacle to functional
activity. An individual with limited functional capacity
is handicapped if there are barriers to accomplishment
of tasks or life activities that can be overcome only by
compensating in some way for the effects of an impairment Such compensation, or, more technically,
"accommodation," normally entails the use of assistive
devices (such as crutches, wheel chairs, hearing aids,
optical magnifiers, prostheses, special tools or equipment), modification of the environment, and/or modification of tasks or activities (such as increasedtimefor
task completion, or special segmentation of tasks). Any
1. The commonly used example of the impact of the loss of the fifth
finger of the left hand illustrates the point. If the individual is a bank
president, the occupational impact is likely to be negligible On the other
hand, a concert pianist is likely to be totally disabled.
2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

one these modalities, or all in combination, may be
invoked to enable a handicapped person to overcome
a barrier to an objective. If the individual is not able
to accomplish a task or activity despite accommodation,
or if there is no accommodation that will enable the
accomplishment, then, in addition to being handicapped, the individual is also disabled. On the other
hand, an impaired individual who is able to accomplish
a task or activity without accommodation is, with
respect to that task or activity, neither handicapped
nor disabled.
For these reasons, it is difficult to overstate the
importance of examining the context in which the terms
"impairment," "disability," or "handicap" appear to avoid
being misled by imprecise usage. For example, reference to a physician's evaluation of "disability" must be
understood as a reference to a medical evaluation of an
individual's health status, or, in the terms of the Guides,
an evaluation of impairment. The physician does not
determine industrial loss of use or economic loss for the
purpose of paying a disability benefit.

Employability—Management/
Administrative Considerations
The concept of "employability" deserves special attention, for in an occupational setting, if an individual,
within the boundaries of the medical condition, has the
capacity with or without accommodation to meet the
job demands and conditions of employment as defined
by the employer, the individual is employable, and,
consequently, not disabled. As an operational matter,
employability is critically related to an individual's
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work, and
to perform assigned tasks and duties for which the
employer is willing to pay wages. If the individual has
those capacities, even in the presence of impairment,
then the individual is not disabled for that job. When
these capacities are called into question, for whatever
reason, the employer must carry out an "employability
determination."
As in determination of disability, there are both
administrative and medical components to the employability determination, the process by which an employer
initially assesses an individual's qualifications and suitability for employment. On the administrative side,
management will specifically assess performance capability to estimate the likelihood of a performance failure
3. The law does not make clear by whom the individual must be
"regarded" as being handicapped.There are cases on record in which an
employer "accommodated" the individual even though there was no
clear evidence or record of medical impairment In these cases, it was
determined that the individual was protected as handicapped under the
law because the employer, by offering accommodation, had regarded the
individual as handicapped
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as well as the likelihood of incurring a future liability in
case of human failure. If neither likelihood of failure is
too great, then the individual is considered to be employable in a particular job. This represents a fundamental
"go" or "no go" determination that there is or is not a
sufficient match between an individual and the job
requirements to give further consideration to employment. It is differentfroma "desirability" determination,
which would rank and compare the individuals who
are employable.
During the course of employment, there is
on-going reassessment of an individual's employability
through monitoring of performance, conduct, and attendance. Employment continues until the employee leaves
voluntarily or until a change gives rise to a deficiency
in performance, conduct, or attendance so that retention in the job can no longer be justified. When an
individual claims to be no longer employable, or disabled, because of a change in health, or alleges that a
medical condition has caused a service deficiency, the
employer has little choice but to conduct an employability determination and to assess the individual's
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work and
to perform assigned tasks and duties. Disability, then, is
the default result when it is determined that the individual lacks employability.

Employability—Medical Considerations
As noted above, an employable individual has the capacity to travel to andfromwork, to be at work, and to
perform assigned tasks and duties. On the other hand,
an individual who does not have the capacity, or who is
unwilling, to travel to andfromwork, to be at work, and
to perform assigned tasks and duties is not employable.
The issue of disability arisesfromthe critical questions
of whether or not the service deficiency can be explained
by a medical condition and whether or not the medical
condition precludes, or warrants restriction from, traveling to and from work, being at work, or performing
assigned tasks and duties. The answer is found in a
"medical determination related to employability."
Thefirstcritical task in carrying out a medical
determination related to employability is to learn about
the job, specifically the expectations of the incumbent
with respect to performance, physical activity, reliability, availability, productivity, expected duration of useful service life and any other criteria associated with
qualification and suitability. Sufficiently detailed information from a job analysis will provide a basis upon
which a physician determines exactly what kinds of
medical information are needed, and to what degree of

detail, to assess an individual's health with respect to
demand criteria. Once the medical information needs
are known, it is possible to develop a medical evaluation protocol, a set of instructions for performance of a
medical evaluation designed to acquire that information.
However, a special medical evaluation may not be
necessary, for; presumably, an individual who alleges
disability would already be under the care of a personal
physician, and if not, should be if the medical condition
is interfering with life activities on or off the job. And,
since a claimant bears the initial burden of proof, the
place to start, then, is with review of medical information already available in the form of medical office and
hospital records. Through this medium, the physician
making the determination of employability may communicate with the personal physician to learn whatever
is known about that individual's health so that, in accordance with established medical diagnostic criteria and
generally accepted medical principles and practice, the
two physicians may come to agreement about what is
and is not known medically about the patient and determine what other information is necessary to resolve
areas of medical uncertainty. This is nothing more or
less than physicians do in the course of cooperative
management of their patients. The practice of medicine
is not an adversary process; and, consequently, by
relying on communications and decisionmaking procedures ordinarily used by physicians, evaluations of
impairment and medical determinations related to
employability may be managed without confrontation
between them. With respect to employability, then, the
medical questions to be answered are whether or not
medical documentation supports a conclusion that the
individual's medical condition precludes travel to and
from work, being at work, or performing assigned tasks
and duties,4 and, in the case of a service deficiency,
whether or not the documentation provides reason to
believe that the medical condition has either caused or
contributed to the deficiency.
If review of the documentation does not show
that the individual has met the required burden of
proof, the employer or insurance company must decide
whether or not acquisition of additional medical information is likely to enable the individual to do so. Or,
there may be a need to verify clinical findings contained in the documentation provided. If so, the medical evaluation protocol will serve as a basis for a medical evaluation by any physician; for; in general, two
4. If the medical condition does not, for example, preclude daily travel to
and from a physical therapy clinic, then it would be unlikely for the
medical condition to preclude travel to and from place of work. Or, if an
individual has not been restricted from shopping for and carrying groceries, from doing chores around the house, or from going to the movies,
then there is little defense for a conclusion that the medical condition
would warrant restriction from a similar level of activities in the workplace.
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physicians examining the same patient under the same
protocol will have approximately the same set of
findings. Taken with the prior information, the results
of this evaluation may be reviewed to reach conclusions that can then be compared with the demand
criteria for the job. This can always be done with credibility and confidence, since the specifications for the
medical evaluation are based on the demand criteria to
begin with.
When approached in this way, the medical input
into the employability determination will be quite independent of the individual's motivation to work, or lack
of it Moreover, because this process provides medical
justification for the decision, a dispute over conflicting
opinions of physicians about nonmedical matters need
never occur.

1.2 Structure and Use of the Guides
Since any person has only one health status and only
one life situation, given enough information about each,
it is possible to understand the relationship and interaction between them. Moreover, because the evaluation
of permanent impairment is not an isolated event but
culminates the evolution of changes in health that result
from injury or disease, the design of the Guides requires
integration of already existing medical and nonmedical
information with the results of a current clinical evaluation, carried out in accordance with the protocols of the
Guides, to characterize fully and assess medical impairment Accomplishment of this objective is based on
utilization of three powerful tools that make up the
fundamental components of the Guides.
First, Chapter 2 details with great precision the
kinds of information needed to document the nature of
an impairment and its consequences, specifies procedures for acquiring the information, and defines a structured format for analyzing, recording, and reporting
the information. A summary of these requirements and
procedures appears at the beginning of each clinical
chapter
Second, the clinical chapters contain definitive
medical evaluation protocols, descriptions of specific
procedures for evaluating a particular body part, function, or system, each developed by recognized medical
specialty consultants.These protocols are defined in
specific detail to ensure the acquisition of sufficient
information to describe fully and characterize the current clinical status of a medical impairment.
Third, the clinical chapters contain reference
tables specifically keyed to the evaluation protocols. If

the protocols and tables have been followed, the clinicalfindingsmay be compared directly to the criteria
and related to a percentage of impairment with
confidence in the validity and acceptability of the
determination.
Operationally, the key to effective and reliable
evaluation of impairment is initially a review of clinical
medical office and hospital records maintained by the
physicians who have provided care and treatment since
the onset of the medical condition. Such records comprise clinical notes of office visits, medical specialty
consultation reports, hospital admission and discharge
summaries, operative notes, pathology reports, laboratory test reports and the results of special tests and
diagnostic procedures. Before formal evaluation is carried out under the Guides, analysis of the history and
course of the medical condition, beginning with the
circumstances of onset, and including findings on previous examinations, the course of treatment, responses
to treatment, and the impact of the medical condition
on life activities, must support a conclusion that an
impairment is permanent and well stabilized.
This information gathering and analysis serves as
the foundation upon which the evaluation of a permanent impairment is carried out. It is most important that
the evaluator obtain all clinical information necessary
to characterize fully the medical condition in accordance with requirements of the Guides; an incomplete
or partial evaluation is not acceptable. Once this task is
accomplished, the clinicalfindingsmay be compared
to the clinical information already contained in the
records about the individual. If the current findings
are found to be consistent with the results of previous
clinical evaluations performed by other observers, then,
with complete confidence, they may be compared, as
appropriate or required, with the reference tables to
determine the percentage rating of the impairment.
However, if thefindingsare not in substantial accordance with the information of record, then, until further clinical evaluation resolves the disparities, the
rating step is meaningless and cannot be carried out.
This approach takes advantage of the fact that
physicians normally communicate cooperatively with
each other orally and in writing to determine what they
do and do not know about a patient, and to determine
further what additional information they need to resolve
areas of medical uncertainty. It does not make sense,
therefore, to manage cases in which there are differing
"opinions" among physicians about the nature and
degree of medical impairment by asking a nonmedical
third party to adjudicate an issue of medical fact! Such

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

differences are best handled through the ordinary process of everyday patient management Then, with reference to the past medical documentation, the medical
evaluation protocols contained in the clinical chapters
and the reporting specifications of Chapter 2, the physician and nonphysician users of the Guides may verify
that sufficient medical information has been assembled
and reported to permit an assessment of an impairment,
to justify any conclusions that are drawn, and to support a rating in accordance with the tables. At that
point, it is a straightforward matter to verify whether or
not a numerical rating of impairment is substantiated
in accordance with the criteria contained in the Guides.

1.3 Medical Impairment and
Workers' Compensation
In general, state and Federal workers' compensation
laws are based on the concept that a worker who either
sustains an injury or incurs an illness arising in the
course of and out of employment is entitled to protection against financial loss without being required to
sue the employer In exchange for their having lost the
right to sue, the workers' compensation system guarantees benefits to all workers who are covered under the
law and who meet the criteria for award of benefits.
The types of payments that may be made when a
claim is approved fall into three categories:
• payments to the claimant to compensate for lost wages
due to temporary total disability;
• payment of medical bills; and
• payment to the claimant of an award for permanent
disability, partial or total.
Up to this point, we have looked at disability as
being related to functional capability or the lack of it
However, in the arena of disability benefits, disability,
whether temporary or permanent, partial or total, is
equivalent to economic loss for which the individual is
to be compensated monetarily.
Payments are made for temporary total disability
when the individual is unable to earn wages, return to
work is expected, and the medical condition has not
stabilized.5 Temporary disability is partial when the individual returns to work but is not earning at the prior
level.
5. In accordance with the earlier discussion, "temporary total disability"
occurs when the medical condition precludes the individual from traveling to and from work, being at work, and performing assigned tasks and
duties.

A permanent disability award is normally independent of the individual's capacity to work and is
formulated in terms of expected or presumed long-term
or permanent economic loss associated with a permanent medical impairment, such as; an amputation. Such
an award may be paid according t:o a schedule that
specifically associates impairment with certain body
parts, functions, or systems; examples are amputations,
loss of sight, and loss of hearing, and a schedule is
defined in the workers' compensation law to equate the
disability with a maximum number of weeks for which
benefits are to be paid at a rate based on average
weekly wages.
Rating of partial disability is necessary when a
law, in recognition that the "loss o f or "loss of use of"
the body part, function, or system may be less than
total, requires determination of trie proportion or percentage of loss. For example, in Maryland, the law says:
In all cases where there has been an amputation
of a part of any member of the body herein specified, or the loss ofuse ^/"(emphasis added) any
part thereof... the Commission shall allow compensation for such proportion of the total number of weeks allowed for the amputation or loss
of use of the entire member as the affected or
amputated portion bears to the whole.6
Moreover; because not all conditions that can arise
out of an injury are accounted for in a schedule, back
injuries, for example, there is likely to be a provision of
the law similar to the following:
In all other cases of disability other than those
specifically enumerated disabilities7...which disability is partial in character; but permanent in
quality, the Commission shall determine the portion or percentage by which the industrial use of
the employee's body was impaired as a result of
the injury and in determining such portion or
percentage of impairment8 resulting in industrial
loss, the Commission shall take into consideration, among other things, the nature of the
physical injury, the occupation, experience,
training, and age of the injured employee, and
shall award compensation in such proportion
as the determined loss bears to 500 weeks...9
(emphasis added)
6. Workmen's Compensation Law of Maryland, Annotated, 1983, Art
101, §36(3).
7. Note the context with which "disability' and "disabilies" are used.
Clearly, the terms should be read as "impairment" and "impairments."
8. Should this read "disability"?

9.Ibid.Ait\0\,36(4)(a).
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While medical information is necessary for the decision
process, a critical problem arises in the use of that
information. Neither in this example nor in general is
there a formula under which knowledge of the medical
condition may be combined with knowledge of the
other factors to calculate the percentage by which
the industrial use of the employee's body is impaired.
Accordingly, each commissioner or hearing official must
come to a conclusion based on his or her own assessment of the available medical and nonmedical
information.
It is evident that the Guides does not offer a
solution for this problem, nor is it the intention that it
do so. Each administrative or legal system that uses
permanent impairment as a basis for disability rating
needs to define its own process for translating knowledge of a medical condition into an estimate of the
degree to which the individual's capacity to meet personal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet statutory or regulatory requirements, is limited by the
impairment. We encourage each system not to make
a "one-to-one" translation of impairment to disability,
in essence creating a use of the Guides which is not
intended.
Chapter 2 will emphasize that it is essential for
the physician to provide the recipient of the medical
information with more than a number that represents a
percentage of impairment. To the extent that the physician provides a comprehensive medical picture in the
form of a report formulated in accordance with (Figure
1), the user of the information will be able to determine
how the medical information fits with all the other
nonmedical information, thereby to reach a true understanding of the impact of the medical impairment on
the claimant's future employability.
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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
GARYE.CROSLAND,
Applicant/Respondent,

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH;
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY;
and SMITH ADMINISTRATORS,

AFFIDAVIT OF
STUART L. POELMAN
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Court of AppealB
No. 910291CA

Defendants/Petitioners.

Comet now the affiant, Stuart L. Poelman, being first duly sworn and deposes as
follows:
1.

That he is an attorney practicing law in the State of Utah and specializing

In workers' compensation cases.
2.

That in 1988 and in years prior thereto he was a member of the Industrial

Commission's Advisory Council and actively participated in the consideration of legislative
changes to be proposed by said Council.
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3.

That in 19S7 and 1988, management and labor factions serving on the

Advisory Council were unable to agree on legislation regarding the Second Injury Fund.
As a result, an ad hoc committee was formed by certain members of the Council, including
the affiant, as well as attorneys practicing workers' compensation law and industry
representatives. This committee proposed, drafted, sponsored and lobbied through passage
by the legislature House Bill No. 218, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4.

The main problem which House Bill No. 218 addressed was maintenance of

the fiscal integrity of the Second Injury Fund which bore the responsibility for the
payment of certain benefits under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Of concern was
the fact that the Second Injury Fund was predicted by consulting actuaries to become
insolvent unless remedial measures were taken.
6.

The intended purpose of House Bill No. 218 was to enhance the funding of

the Second Injury Fund through an employer's premium tax increase and to reduce the
liability of the Second Injury Fund for workers' compensation benefits. The bill eliminated
benefits which were then being paid to injured employees for permanent partial disability
compensation resulting from permanent partial impairment caused by preexisting
conditions. The bill also served to reduce certain reimbursements made to employers by
the Second Injury Fund. Prior to the passage of House Bill No. 218, the Second Injury
Fund had been held liable for permanent partial impairment which had been caused by
preexisting conditions. It was the intent of House Bill No. 218 to eliminate that liability.
6.

Prior to the passage of House Bill No. 218, the employer responsible for a

particular industrial accident was shielded from liability for that portion of permanent
partial impairment caused by preexisting conditions. It was never the intent of House Bill
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No. 218 to transfer the liability for impairment caused by preexisting conditions from the
Second Injury Fund to the employer. Rather, it was the intent of said legislation to
eliminate permanent partial disability benefits payable to the injured employee to the
extent that permanent partial disability compensation related to permanent partial
impairment resulting from preexisting conditions.
7.

It was never the intent of House Bill 218 to make an employer liable for

compensation relating to asymptomatic preexisting conditions. All preexisting conditions
related to asymptomatic or symptomatic preexisting permanent partial impairment were
to go uncompensated.
DATED this

\ °\,

dav of

.Stuart L. Poelman
Attorney at Law
Subscribed and sworn to before me this KP*dav of May, 1992

•"Notary Public /
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